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The prevention of nuclear smuggling is an essential first step in preventing a nuclear terrorist attack against the US. Without access to nuclear materials and without the ability of the terrorists to smuggle the nuclear material or a "weapon" into a protected area, the United States is not threatened and an attack will not occur. The first steps are to understand the problem, know the current capabilities, and to develop a set of solutions designed to improve the ability to prevent nuclear material smuggling. In order to appreciate the scope of the problem of preventing nuclear material smuggling, this paper will review current US policies, the international programs and policies with a focus on the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the history of known nuclear material smuggling operations, the potential sources of nuclear material, current US and international efforts, nuclear detection technologies, and other programs to prevent nuclear smuggling. Finally a set of findings and recommendations will be presented that include establishing a commission to prevent nuclear terrorism modeled after the 9/11 Commission, but established before an attack occurs.
Are We Doing Enough to Prevent a Nuclear Terrorist Attack?
Who in the US government will we blame for failing to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack against the United States? Make no mistake about it; everyone will blame someone and there will be plenty of blame to go around. The Nation will demand and expect immediate attribution and punishment of the organization(s) responsible for the attack, but there will also be a demand to punish those in Washington who failed to prevent the attack. From the citizens of America will be calls for war, calls for resignations, calls for action, and everyone will want to know who to blame. Was the attack the result of another failure of the intelligence community? Did we make the right investments in technologies sponsored by the different agencies of the US government?
Could the Department of Defense (DoD) have prevented this attack? Where was the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and were they in charge? Even more directly, the Nation will demand to know who was in charge and why they failed. Is the White Similar to the events following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, there will be a congressional commission appointed to identify how the entire interagency community, the international organizations and agencies, and America's international partners failed by allowing terrorists to gain access to nuclear materials, smuggle the nuclear materials into "protected" areas, and use the nuclear materials to attack the United States. The United States will take the appropriate action after a deadly terrorist attack, but it will be too late. The Nation will once again send the military to kill those responsible for the attacks but the military solution will not answer the lingering question of how was it possible that our nation publically acknowledged legitimate concerns about nuclear terrorism, yet failed to commit the resources and effort to prevent the attack. Someone, or more likely, everyone will share the blame, but why wait? The critical question that needs to be addressed immediately is why the US government should wait for an attack and a devastating blow to the United States before forming a congressional or national committee to prevent nuclear smuggling and a nuclear attack against the United States.
Instead of sharing the blame and pointing fingers after a nuclear terrorist attack, the Congress and the President should immediately establish a national bi-partisan commission to review the current status of the full spectrum capabilities to prevent nuclear terrorism. The effort of the newly appointed Commission to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism (CPNT) should include an honest look at the established unity of command of the current effort and the synchronization and the prioritization of the broad range of resources and organizations. The commission should review all of the topics related to nuclear terrorism. There is little doubt that most want desperately to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack and every single organization involved in the prevention of nuclear smuggling is attempting to do the right thing. The commission's task should include ensuring that the government bureaucracies are not getting in their own way and that but not until after the terrorist attacks against the US. 2 Could the US have prevented 9/11 if the national leadership had adopted the recommendations before the terrorist attacks? Likewise, is it possible to take action now to prevent the nuclear nightmare or do we wait for the attack?
The prevention of nuclear smuggling is an essential first step in preventing a nuclear terrorist attack against the US. Without access to nuclear materials and without 4 the ability of the terrorists to smuggle the nuclear material or a "weapon" into a protected area, the United States is not threatened and an attack will not occur. The first steps are to understand the problem, know the current capabilities, and to develop a set of solutions designed to improve the ability to prevent nuclear material smuggling.
In order to appreciate the scope of the problem of preventing nuclear material smuggling, this paper will review current US policies, the international programs and policies with a focus on the UN and the IAEA, the history of known nuclear material smuggling operations, the potential sources of nuclear material, current US and international efforts, nuclear detection technologies, and other programs to prevent nuclear smuggling. Finally a set of findings and recommendations will be presented.
Throughout the paper the reader should keep in mind and try to formulate an answer to the fundamental question of "who in the US government will we blame" as we explore the current efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling.
Current US Policy
President Obama once said, "A potential game changer would be a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists, blowing up a major American city…And so when I go down the list of things I have to worry about all the time, that is at the top, because that's one area you can't afford any mistakes." 3 Is this concern, at the top of the President's national security list, reflected in the national security policy? The National
Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America 2011 states clearly, "We will counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation as it presents a grave and common threat to our Nation and others. Working through institutions, alliances and coalitions, we will dismantle proliferation networks, interdict movement of materials, further improve nuclear forensics capabilities, and secure nuclear, chemical, and fully. 12 The UN Security Council resolutions demonstrate the commitment of the 193 current members to preventing nuclear smuggling and nuclear proliferation, but that does not prevent terrorists and smuggling organizations from attempting to locate, transport, and secure nuclear materials.
Another international organization committed to preventing nuclear material smuggling and nuclear terrorism is the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA has been described as, "The most important and authoritative nuclear security agency in the world. It has a well-deserved reputation as an objective, non-aligned, science-based organization, and therefore, carries much moral authority." 13 In response to a resolution by the IAEA General Conference in September 2002, the IAEA adopted an integrated approach to protection against nuclear terrorism. This approach coordinates IAEA activities concerned with the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations, nuclear material accountancy, detection of and response to trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, the security of radioactive sources, security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material, emergency response and emergency preparedness measures in Member States and at the IAEA, and the promotion of adherence by States to relevant international instruments. The IAEA also helps to identify threats and vulnerabilities related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material. However, it is the responsibility of States to provide for the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and the associated facilities, to ensure the security of such material in transport, and to combat illicit trafficking and the inadvertent movement of radioactive material. 14 The IAEA has a lead international role in tracking and preventing nuclear material smuggling. The security of the US partially depends on the success of the IAEA in this endeavor to defeat and prevent nuclear smuggling. International cooperation remains a key element of prevention, but that does not mean that attempts to smuggle nuclear materials will evaporate. As recent events have shown, nuclear smuggling is a real concern and the international community must remain vigilant and committed to each element of the overall effort of preventing nuclear terrorist attacks.
History of Known Nuclear Smuggling Operations
Since 1993 the IAEA has recorded more than 1,300 confirmed reports on incidents involving smuggling, theft, loss and illegal disposal, illegal possession and transfer, or attempted illegal sales of nuclear or radioactive materials 15 and there have been over 400 incidents reported by governments to the International Atomic Energy
Agency involving unauthorized possession of nuclear and radiological material, and related criminal activities. 16 The most common smuggling operations involve radioactive isotopes like Cesium-137 from nuclear medicine therapy units, Cobalt-60 from food sterilization irradiators, Strontium-90 from communications generators, and Ammericium-241 from oil exploration sensors. 17 These radioactive isotopes are more widely available than special nuclear material like Uranium-235 and Plutonium-239. A terrorist group would not use the medical isotopes to design and build a nuclear weapon, but the isotopes could be used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) to spread radioactive contaminates in a local area using conventional explosives. The radioactive material from an RDD would unlikely kill or severely injure anyone, but would make the clean-up more difficult and potentially have a significant psychological impact.
An example of a recent smuggling event occurred on April 11, 2012 when teams from a Turkish anti-smuggling unit seized two glass tubes containing 500 grams of Cesium-137 which they suspected was smuggled to Turkey from Russia through Georgia. 18 Of more interest are the reported cases of smuggling weapons grade nuclear material which, given appropriate quantities, can be used for a nuclear weapon or an improvised nuclear device. The total reported seizures of Uranium-235 and weapons grade plutonium between 1992 and 2006 were around 9.4 kilograms which is less material than is typically required to assemble a nuclear weapon. 19 However, this does not necessarily tell the entire story. For instance, according to a Czech police 11 investigation of a 1994 seizure in Prague of 2.7 kilograms of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU), 20 smugglers claimed they could deliver to buyers an additional 40 kilograms of HEU in the short term and 5 kilograms each month over the next 12 months. 21 The truth in the smugglers claim was never verified, but the potential to smuggle enough weapons grade material to build a nuclear weapon remains a real concern.
To many it is almost inconceivable to believe that all attempts to smuggle nuclear material have been interdicted or identified. What should worry everyone is what they don't know about what has been smuggled without detection or is in storage and available for smuggling to a terrorist group. If the success rate of interdicting nuclear material is similar to the success rate of interdicting drugs then the US may have a real problem. According to the San Francisco Chronicle, only 10 to 15 percent of the drugs that smugglers try to move are seized by law enforcement. 22 If the same interdiction percentages apply to nuclear materials then large quantities of fissile material has potentially been smuggled without detection and may be in the hands of terrorists or waiting to be delivered to a terrorist organization.
Sources of Nuclear Material
Most of the material associated with known nuclear smuggling attempts originated in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The nuclear material has come from nuclear power plants, military facilities, factories or mines in Central and Eastern
Europe. In most cases, the packaging of the illicit radioactive material was not adequate, suggesting amateur operations, and represented a danger to the public and the environment. A professional or knowledgeable nuclear smuggling operation would Significant efforts have been put in place to control the weapons grade material and radioactive isotopes, but nuclear material smugglers and potential terrorist groups have attempted and will continue to attempt to exploit insider vulnerabilities and gain access to nuclear material. The reward is worth the risk and will remain a concern as long as weapons grade material exists. The unanswered question and concern is whether or not there have been successful efforts to acquire enough nuclear materials to build a weapon. If a terrorist group acquires enough material to build a nuclear device then the US and international community must prevent the weapon from being moved to a point where it will be detonated. NSOI seeks to enhance partnerships with key countries around the world to strengthen capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to incidents of nuclear smuggling. In its bilateral partnerships, NSOI engages those countries seen to be most important to the global effort to combat smuggling of nuclear or highly radioactive materials. 27 The NSOI 14 team works with the government of each such country to reach a common understanding on its current capabilities to counter the nuclear smuggling threat and to identify ways that international partners can improve the full spectrum capabilities of the country. NSOI also negotiates a Joint Action Plan with the partner governments specifying in detail agreed priority steps to improve its anti-nuclear smuggling capabilities. This plan includes both ongoing efforts that should be completed as well as new efforts that should be undertaken, and thus serves to place all relevant cooperative activities with the partner government into a single, coherent framework.
According to the NSOI website:
NSOI has to date completed Joint Action Plans and developed antinuclear smuggling cooperative projects with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Moldova, Tajikistan, Slovakia, and Uzbekistan. In Ukraine, for example, the established joint action plan includes 30 priority steps to improve Ukrainian capabilities; half of these steps involve ongoing efforts that need to be completed, and the other half involve new efforts that should be undertaken. The joint list of priority assistance projects includes seven projects on radioactive sources, seven on border detection, one on prosecution, one on nuclear forensics, two on anticorruption training, and two on nuclear security. agreed on the urgency and seriousness of the threat; agreed to work towards the goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world; reaffirmed the fundamental responsibility of nations, consistent with their international obligations, to maintain effective security of the nuclear materials and facilities under their control; and agreed to work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as necessary. 530 kilograms of HEU from eight countries were removed for disposal, an amount enough to produce about 21 nuclear weapons; several countries committed to repatriate their unneeded HEU; Ukraine and Mexico accomplished a total "cleanout" of all stockpiles of HEU; HEU equivalent to nearly 3,000 nuclear weapons in Russia and the US was down blended to low enriched uranium (LEU). 30 Additionally, Russia and the US were working on implementing the plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed between the two countries at the Washington Summit, which will result in the disposal of enough plutonium for 17,000 nuclear weapons and Kazakhstan, in cooperation with Russia, the US, the UK and the IAEA, secured spent nuclear fuel which contained enough HEU and plutonium to make several hundreds of nuclear weapons by moving them to a new facility for a long-term storage; and Sweden returned several kilograms of plutonium to the US. CNSTs serve as highly specialized teams that continue to provide assistance to international partners and enhance the capacity to detect and respond to smuggling activities taking place within a country's borders and complements fixed radiation detection equipment along a country's perimeter. Since 2011, the US has worked with the governments of Lithuania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and others, to establish national CNS teams. Through the State Department's NSOI, the United States partners with key countries around the world to strengthen capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to incidents of nuclear smuggling. 32 International cooperation programs are essential and will remain a cornerstone in this effort.
Nuclear Material Detection Technologies
But what if the international effort fails to identify and interdict the nuclear material and terrorists attempt to smuggle either a nuclear weapon or nuclear material into the US? One of the organizations with the responsibility to prevent nuclear material from entering the US is the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO's mandate is to improve the nation's capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the nation, and to further enhance this capability over time. With assistance and participation from a wide variety of US Government departments and agencies, DNDO synchronizes and integrates interagency efforts to develop technical nuclear detection capabilities, characterizes detector system performance, ensures effective response to detection alarms, integrates nuclear forensics efforts, coordinates the global detection architecture and conducts a transformational research and development program for advanced technology to detect nuclear and radiological materials. 33 As part of their effort, DNDO has worked with US Customs and Border Protection to deploy radiation portal monitors and other radiation detection technologies to seaports, land border ports, and mail facilities around the world. Today, these systems scan 100 percent of all containerized cargo and personal vehicles arriving in the US through land ports of entry, as well as over 99 percent of arriving sea containers.
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The capability of the radiation portal monitors and other detection technologies continues to advance but there is currently no fail-safe technology that provides absolute certainty that nuclear material passing through a detector is properly identified or even detected. There are simple physical and scientific limitations to the capability of technology to detect all nuclear materials in every possible configuration and shipping container. Sensors, both active and passive, are available that detect and identify nuclear materials but a determined adversary may employ techniques to prevent detection or significantly reduce the signature of the material.
Passive detectors typically measure gamma or neutron emission from spontaneous fissions and decays within the nuclear material. When the detector determines that the radiation from a source is more intense than the normal background radiation, the detector signals a possible source of the increased radioactivity. There are a number of common natural and manmade sources of radiation, such as cat litter, bananas, or granite that may trigger the detector. Once a radioactive source is located the specific element is identified through a more detailed spectral analysis. Currently, there are several types of passive detection systems deployed by federal, state, and local entities. Examples include but are not limited to: personal radiation detectors which are generally small, pocket-sized devices used as scanning tools to search for 18 and detect nuclear and radiological materials; hand-held radioisotope identification devices are designed to identify the radionuclides present in radioactive materials and sources and are used by law enforcement officers and technical experts during routine operations; radiation portal monitors which are large, usually fixed, detectors typically composed of polyvinyl toluene for gamma detection and helium-3 tubes for neutron detection, and are often used to scan vehicles or cargo at fixed chokepoints such as ports of entry and weigh stations; mobile and transportable detectors that are mounted in a ship, vehicle, or trailer and used for area surveillance, search, or temporary checkpoint deployments; and backpack based radiation detection systems used in mobile or checkpoint operations to search for nuclear threat materials. 35 Active nuclear detection systems are commonly used for radiography or for secondary inspection. 36 Active detectors use gamma, neutron, or x-ray sources to interrogate the material or shipping containers causing isolated fissions, nuclear excitation and decay, or atomic excitations and decay. X-Ray imagery can be used to search for dense materials or unique configurations of materials associated with a nuclear weapon or nuclear material storage. Significant investments have been made by DHS and DoE to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, size, and cost of the detectors, but there remain serious hurdles for implementation. To support the development of these systems, additional research and development is needed in neutron and gamma ray sources, detection models, neutron and gamma ray emission data, and neutron and gamma ray simulation codes. Although not covered in this document, there are identified nuclear material interdiction and nuclear material security teams throughout the DoD and well placed in other government agencies. These highly specialized and well trained teams are capable of responding to support nuclear material interdiction throughout the US and the world. Although the composition and specific mission of these teams is classified, one should assume that several departments and agencies within the US government have these teams trained, equipped, and prepared for the specific interdiction missions with a rapid response capability.
The effort to prevent nuclear smuggling is comprehensive, joint, interagency, and Congress establish the commission to prevent nuclear terrorism they will review much of what has been presented in this paper. The commission will conclude that there are many organizations in place to prevent nuclear smuggling and a nuclear attack, but there is still work do be done. Like the 9/11 Commission, the CPNT will ultimately offer recommendations to improve the Nation's ability to protect the country from attack and mitigate the identified risks. Some of the potential findings and recommendations from the commission are shown below.
Finding and Recommendations (1)
Finding: No one is in charge. There is absolutely no established unity of command or a command structure in place to provide the unified leadership required for this full spectrum effort to prevent nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorist attacks.
There are lots of people working very hard to protect the US from a nuclear attack and to prevent nuclear smuggling, but no one organization is in charge of synchronizing the joint/interagency/international effort, prioritizing investments, coordinating organizational overlaps, and standing before Congress and the President on an annual basis providing updates. One can easily hide behind and blame the bureaucracies, the gargantuan administrative hurdles, and the protection of the "rice bowls" of Washington, but this will be an unacceptable excuse in the eyes of the American public after 100,000 citizens die in a nuclear attack that may have been preventable. Nearly everyone in this business recognizes the lack of synchronized national leadership and yet no one does anything to provide a solution. There is not even a National Security Staff or National Security
Council counter-nuclear terrorism or counter nuclear smuggling integrated policy committee.
Recommendations:
The President should appoint a nuclear terrorist attack prevention czar to head the CPNT. The czar should report directly to Congress and the President on an annual basis providing updates and recommending necessary changes to keep American safe. The President should establish a joint/interagency task force and place the nuclear terrorist prevention czar in charge of all activities related to nuclear smuggling and preventing nuclear terrorist attacks. Additionally, an interagency policy committee should also be established to make a recommendation on how to 23 better organize the national effort and coordinate the interagency effort. Anything short of a unified national effort is unacceptable.
Finding and Recommendation (2)
Finding: Related to the first finding of the absence of an interagency chain of command is the lack of coordination required to respond to and conduct time-sensitive interdiction or material snatch activities. The interdiction could be inside the US or anywhere in in the world. The potential timeline for a snatch and secure operation may be very short and detailed information will need to flow quickly to the right organization leading the operation. Fusion of all available information will need to happen quickly with the support of the entire interagency and international community.
Recommendation: An interagency fusion cell must be established to coordinate the flow of intelligence and information. There are existing fusion cells that could potentially be used to assemble and disseminate information quickly, but only if all agencies and organizations were connected to the fusion cell. Every warrior and bureaucrat knows from experience that unless the interagency relationships are established and exercised well before the real-world event then success in a live operation is unlikely. Without a lead for the overall mission of countering nuclear smuggling, there will remain reasonable concerns across the security community about the ability to respond in a timely manner.
Finding and Recommendations (3)
Finding: Human intelligence (HUMINT) networks are the most important investment and essential for preventing nuclear material smuggling. Most, if not all, of the hundreds of attempts to smuggle nuclear materials that have been interdicted resulted from human intelligence and human network information sharing systems.
Recommendations: MG (Ret) Bruce Lawlor offers a great solution:
The expertise in the US for investigating organized crime and illicit trafficking resides within the US law enforcement agencies…The US should strengthen the existing counter-smuggling authorities of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and provide it with the resources to develop a counter-smuggling network of regional law enforcement agencies to combat illicit nuclear trafficking. 40 Additionally, as the US continues to develop a HUMINT capability, the counter-nuclear smuggling community needs to maintain a focus on explicitly tracking sophisticated smuggling operations.
Finding and Recommendation (4)
Finding: Investments in detector technology need to be evaluated and prioritized. The author is not aware of any nuclear fissile material ever detected and interdicted by sole use of this technology. Perhaps the placement of detectors at international borders, ports, terminals, and other deliberate locations dissuades nuclear smuggling operations, but there is little reason to believe that detectors or detector technologies will prevent nuclear smuggling. There is no amount of money that could be invested in technology designed to detect and prevent nuclear material smuggling that would provide a complete solution. One of the lessons learned in the effort to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED) was for every multi-million dollar investment in technology developed to prevent IEDs, the adversary developed a counter-defeat strategy. In fact, as the technology advanced to defeat IEDs, the insurgents simplified their employment of IEDs by minimizing the technology required to detonate the devices. In other words, as the counter-technology improves, the insurgents (or smugglers) find a way to counter the capability and this counter-counter-technology often becomes harder to defeat and less vulnerable to advanced technology.
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Recommendation: Investments in nuclear detector technology should be part of the national effort, but not at the expense of human intelligence networks. The real risk of large investments in detectors and detector technology becomes over-confidence and over-reliance on technology. There are many who believe that detector technology can solve most of the problems of nuclear smuggling and they are wrong. The misguided further believe that once the money is spent and the technology is deployed then the nation is secure.
Finding and Recommendations (5)
Finding: Complacency is a concern and increases vulnerability to attack and the probability of a successful smuggling operation. On the surface one might conclude that because so many organizations are invested in preventing nuclear smuggling that everything that could be done is being done. A complacency trap that must be avoided is that the United States is spending lots of money, the President has made preventing a nuclear terrorist attack a priority, and Congress is involved, therefore the Nation is safe. This attitude can lead to complacency and complacency increases the risk of attack. The attitude that all that can be done is being done, coupled with the fact that there has been a very recent real decline in known nuclear smuggling attempts, may keep this essential effort off of the "radar screen" of the national leadership.
Recommendations: Leaders of all organizations must demand due diligence from all who work to prevent nuclear smuggling. In addition, the annual briefing to the President and Congress will force an annual review across all agencies supporting counter-nuclear smuggling and should minimize the probability of complacency. are located all over the world. 41 The IMS is a great example of the type of international cooperation that should be leveraged to prevent nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorist attacks.
Recommendation:
The international nuclear material detectors should be networked and integrated into an international monitoring system that could stand alone as a separate international network or be integrated into the existing IMS. Integration into the existing IMS would enhance all non-proliferation efforts and strengthen the international effort to combat nuclear smuggling, nuclear proliferation, and monitor nuclear testing.
27 Finding (7)
Finding: Enough weapons grade material may have already been smuggled into the hands of terrorists. These unknown unknowns remain a real concern. If the interdiction rate of nuclear material is similar to the reported interdiction rate of drugs smuggled into the US, conservatively around 20 percent, then there could be considerable successfully smuggled U-235 scattered or concentrated in the world.
Given that the total weapons grade U-235 confiscated between 1992 and 2006 was roughly 10 kg then with the 20 percent interdiction rate, there could easily be 40-kg or more of smuggled material available to terrorist. There may be more or there may be less but the threat remains real.
Finding and Recommendation (8)
Finding: The counter-nuclear smuggling and intelligence communities must continue to look for organized nuclear smuggling operations. Most, if not all, of the nuclear smuggling operations involved unorganized attempts to sell nuclear materials to which someone had access and took advantage of a chance to make money. In several cases, the smugglers were caught while they were trying to find someone to buy the nuclear material instead of smuggling the material for a pre-arranged buyer. In almost every case, the smugglers did not specialize in nuclear material, but took advantage of an opportunity to make money selling nuclear material even though their primary contraband was other illicit material such as cigarettes, drugs, or people. If an organized effort was committed to securing nuclear material and smuggling that material to a safe haven, then the chances of success would be much greater than the typical smuggling operations of the past. In fact, Bruce Lawlor predicts, "The increasing involvement of organized crime in the nuclear black market strongly suggest that absent real changes in law enforcement activities in the Black Sea region, terrorist will eventually be able to buy enough fissile material there to build an atomic bomb."
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Recommendation: The US and the international community must remain focused on building comprehensive information sharing and human intelligence networks, as well as leveraging the current technologies, in order to prevent the unknown unknowns associated with nuclear terrorism. The intelligence community must remain committed to following every lead that might suggest the presence of a nuclear weapon or enough material to build a nuclear weapon.
Finding and Recommendations (9)
Finding: The US and the international community must remain creative in order to stay ahead of smuggling operations and prevent nuclear smuggling and nuclear attacks. The 9/11 Commission Report duly noted, "Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies…It is therefore crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination. Doing so requires more than finding an expert who can imagine that aircraft could be used as weapons." 43 Individually or collectively the US and international communities have not always demonstrated the necessary imagination and creativity to prevent a determined nuclear smuggling operation or anticipate nuclear smuggling scenarios. Although technology is useful, the community cannot rely too heavily on the technology as the principal means of preventing smuggling and continue to invest in human capital.
Recommendations: International red teams and specialized human terrain teams must be organized to consider unique sources of material, smuggling routes, smuggling vehicles, and highly specialized use of small quantities of nuclear material.
The counter-nuclear smuggling red teams must constantly consider: new and old 29 sources of material, possible locations where the successfully smuggled material can be stored and weaponized, the most vulnerable targets that allow the easiest access of nuclear material, the details of how successful smuggling operations work, and what group has a real desire to acquire a nuclear weapon (this is not a trivial question considering that no organization has detonated a radiological dispersal device even though many organizations have had access to the appropriate material). The creative use of human intelligence and human networking must remain a primary effort to prevent nuclear smuggling. In order to defeat a determined adversary, who by definition operates in an asymmetric environment, the successful counter-smuggling operation must always expect the unexpected and anticipate the unanticipated. Imagination and creative analysis must become part of and strongly encouraged in the organizations charged with preventing nuclear smuggling. Finally, one must presume that the commitment to smuggle nuclear materials is as least as great as the commitment to prevent nuclear smuggling. Staying ahead of the smugglers and the terrorists requires a learning organization that is front loaded with creative thinking. Success also depends on a system that does not get in its own way.
Conclusion
There are actions the country should take now to improve the Nation's ability to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack. The first step in protecting the US from attack is preventing a terrorist group from gaining access to nuclear material and this requires an organized, synchronized, and well led US and international counter-nuclear smuggling America from a nuclear terrorist attack and prevent nuclear smuggling. The CPNT and a counter-nuclear smuggling czar should be established and meet on an annual or semi-annual basis to provide their recommendations directly to the President. Waiting until after a nuclear catastrophe occurs to stand up a commission to examine the obvious failure of the US government should not be an option. The time to act is now.
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